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IN THE

SUPREME COURT
OF THE

STATE OF UTAH
MACK FINANCIAL CORPORATION,
Plaintiff,
Case No.
vs.
NEVADA MOTOR RENTALS, INC.,
Defendant-Appellant.

13603

REPLY BRIEF OF DEFENDANT-APPELLANT

STATEMENT OF NATURE OF CASE
This Brief of Fact and Law is supplemental to Defendant's Brief on Appeal.
Defendant incorporates all parts of its Brief on Appeal and specifically makes them a part hereof.
DISPOSITION OF CASE IN LOWER COURT
The latter portion of Plaintiff's Statement of the
Nature of the Case is misleading. The Court arrived at
its amount of judgment as set forth hereafter in this
Brief on page 12.
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STATEMENT OF FACTS
Defendant incorporates the Statement of Facts contained in his Brief on Appeal. Defendant further comments on the Statements of Facts set out by Plaintiff
as follows:
1. The trucks were driven to Mack Trucks' lot in
February of 1970, and Mack Financial is a wholly owned
subsidiary of Mack Trucks.
The Denver outlet of Mack Trucks is a company
outlet and not an agency or dealer. R-30.
Also, Mack Financial was not concerned with possession of the vehicles because Mack Trucks had possession and control. R-46 and 47.
Mr. Roddy (Manager at Mack Trucks) asked Mr.
Adams (Manager at Mack Financial) if they could
dispose of the trucks. He was told that they could not,
thus showing the control of Mack Financial over the
trucks. R-115 and 116.
2. There is a conflict of testimony regarding the
Second Point cited by the Plaintiff.
3. The word abandoned is used by Counsel many
places in Plaintiff's Brief. This use of word is not consistent with the facts. The trucks were not abandoned. They
were delivered to Mack Trucks, a factory representative,
and Mack Trucks took the vehicles into custody, possession and care. At no time were the vehicles abandoned
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in fact or in law, and the lower court made no such finding.
4. There is a conflict of testimony on the Fourth
Point and the matter has been fully treated in the Defendant's Brief on Appeal.
5. The record indicates that Scott Trucking had
freight business, but the witness clearly indicates that
Scott had this business, before the purchase contract
was entered into for the vehicles. The conclusion that
the freight business was a consideration for the purchase
of the vehicles is not supported by the evidence. R-160
and 161.
6. Defendant admits the published notices in the
newspaper. The notice to counsel only appears as a
part of the Brief which counsel submitted to the Trial
Court on a Motion for Summary Judgment, and is
nowhere sustained in the evidence. The Finding of Fact
No. 13, is not substantiated by any evidence adduced at
the Trial.
7. Defendant admits that the documents contain a
provision providing for a reasonable attorney's fees.
ARGUMENT
POINT I.
DEFENDANT AMPLY TREATED QUESTION OF JURISDICTION IN HIS BRIEF
ON APPEAL. PLAINTIFF ADDS NOTHING
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EITHER BY WAY OF CASES, STATUTES
OR ARGUMENT TO THAT POINT.
POINT II.
THE METHOD OF SALE OF THE VEHICLES WAS NOT COMMERCIALLY REASONABLE FOR TWO REASONS: (A) FAILURE TO GIVE NOTICE; AND (B) FOR THE
REASON THAT THE SALE WAS NOT
MADE FOR TWO YEARS AFTER THE REPOSSESSION.
The remedy for a sale which is not commercially
reasonable should be the loss of any deficiency. The
Plaintiff in his Point II relies heavily on a line of cases
which the most recent is reflected in Grant County Tractor Company v. Nuss, 496 Pac. 2d 966, 6 Washington
Appeals, 866. It is believed that the facts of the case are
distinguishable from the case at law which this Court
is considering on a number of grounds, the most important
of which is that the buyers rescinded their contract and
gave written notice of such rescision.
There may be many reasons why a sale may not be
a commercially reasonable sale. It is Defendant's position
that the sale conducted by the Plaintiff was not commercially reasonable for two reasons (one would be sufficient) :
a. No notice of sale was given the Defendants, and
b. The sale was held two years after repossession.
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The plaintiff cites cases to show that public policy
frowns on forfeitures. The requested finding is not a forfeiture nor a penalty, but a common sense approach to
a problem which would not exist if the Plaintiff had given
notice of sale, or if the Plaintiff had otherwise conducted
a commercially reasonable sale. Since all of the elements
of choice reside with the Plaintiff and the Plaintiff chooses
the place, manner and the notice and even the acceptance of a figure of sale, and where no notice of sale is
given the Defendant so that the Defendant can monitor
the method of sale and indeed can bring in persons to bid,
then the true market value of the security being sold
cannot easily be determined. Where should the burden
of determining the exact amount of damages fall? On the
Plaintiff who caused the problem, or on the Defendant
who should have the right to appear and establish sales
price by positive action? In a Wyoming case, October 18,
1972, the Court said:
"Even so, we are persuaded that one general
principal upon which Plaintiffs rely is applicable
here, that is, compliance with 34-9-504(3) is a
condition precedent to recovery of any deficiency
"'"*' between sale price of collateral and the amount
of the unpaid balance . . . The law requires more
than a reasonable expectation on the part of the
debtor if the notice requirement of the commercial code is to be satisfied. Where Plaintiffs
have not been informed as to whether Defendants contemplated private or public sale of
diamond bracelet. . . and did not waive demand
to redeem and notice of time and place of sale,
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Defendants were not entitled to recovery or
allege deficiency of interest and attorney's fees."
Aimonetto v. Keeps, Wyoming, October 18, 1972, 501
Pac. 2d 1017.
The facts of the above case parallel the facts at bar.
The real purchaser, Scott, had returned the vehicles. Defendant was a guarantor of Scott's contract and entitled
to Notice.
The Colorado Appeals Court, Colorado held:
"The sale of automobiles is not a recognized market under 9-504(3), and since there is no recognized market . . . the debtors were entitled to
notice of sale of the repossessed automobiles."
The Court also stated:
"In an action to recover the deficiency judgment,
the burden is upon the secured party to prove
the amount of the deficiency. Whenever the
value of a collateral is at issue, there is a presumption that the value of the repossessed collateral equals the value of the outstanding debt."
Community Management Association of Colorado
Springs, Inc., v. Ford Motor Company, Colorado Appeals,
505 Pac. 2d 1314.
The above cases exemplify the two lines of authority
in recent cases in the United States dealing with sales of
secured items and the treatment of those sales, When
those sales have not been in a commercially reasonable
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manner. As nearly as Counsel can determine, the question
is one of first impression in the State of Utah. In making
such a determination, it would appear that the failure to
give notice is a special type of sale which is not commercially reasonable. Where notice of sale has not been given,
it would appear that the sale is more defective and to a
greater degree more commercially unreasonable than for
some other impropriety of sale. The Defendant in this
action maintains that the sale was not commercially reasonable, and that the sale of the vehicles two years after
they had been repossessed was damaging to the Defendant, by reason that there was no notice of sale given.
If the sale was commercially unreasonable, as we maintain, then there is no question under the law, that the
Defendant is entitled to recover damages. The next question that arises is what is the measure of damages. The
lower Court held that the damages consisted of the difference between what the vehicles would have sold for had
they been sold promptly by June 30, 1970, and not two
years later. The Trial Court made a finding with respect
to this amount of damages. The next question that arises
is, would a different rule of law apply if the commercially
unreasonable transaction arose from the failure to give
notice. We maintain that it would. If notice is not given,
then the sale which occurs with respect to the Defendant,
at least, is essentially, a private sale. The Defendant is
not allowed to appear and monitor the sale, and is not
allowed to appear and determine for himself the final
condition of the vehicles being sold; the defendant is not
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allowed to appear with his own buyers or to make his own
tender and purchase such as to reduce or completely
eliminate any deficiency which might be assessed. As a
result of this, the Courts have held that where a notice
of sale is not given that even if the line of reasoning forfeiting the deficiency is not followed, that the burden falls
heavily upon the Plaintiff to show that the sale price was
a fair price, and that there is a presumption that the value
of the goods sold would equal the amount of the indebtedness.
In this case, we maintain, that the Court should follow
the reasoning in the line of cases requiring the deficiency
to be forfeited where notice is not given. However, if
that line of reasoning is not followed, the Plaintiff must
bear the burden of proof of overcoming the presumption
that the security is equal to the outstanding indebtedness. The number of believable witnesses testified that
the value of the vehicles was much greater than that
which was the purchase price, and much greater than
that which was determined by the lower court (See Finding 22, Review of Testimony on value of vehicles in Defendant's Brief).
For the above reasons, it is submitted that there
should be no deficiency assessed against the Defendant.
POINT III.
P L A I N T I F F ERRONEOUSLY STATES
THAT THE COURT FOUND APPELLANT
HAD RECEIVED NOTICE.
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This allegation is not borne out by the evidence. It
is not found in Finding No. 13. It is not found in R-633
and R-634 of the record. The letter of Counsel was not introduced into evidence and no evidence was introduced
showing any notice of any type to Defendant. Defendant
was entitled to notice and there was simply no notice
given. In addition to the portion of the case cited by
Plaintiff in his Brief (Nelson v. Monarch Investment
Plan of Henderson, Inc., 451 S. W. 2d 375, C. A. Ky. 1970),
the Court stated:
"Requirement of reasonable notification to defaulting maker of note of time after which a private sale or repossessed automobile is to be made
by holder of note means that maker is entitled
to notification of specific date after which holder
may proceed to dispose of collateral."
Debtor's knowledge that repossessed automobiles
would eventually be sold to satisfy indebtedness did not
constitute reasonable notification of time after which
private sale could properly be made by creditor.
We also point out that the facts differ greatly in the
cited case since the case referred to was a judicial sale
made during the process of litigation.
Unless the publication of the notice in newspapers
in Denver can be construed to be notice to the Defendant,
there simply was no notice given to Defendant of the
sale.
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POINTS IV AND V.
POINTS IV AND V COVERING THE VALUES OF THE VEHICLES AND THE REPAIRS WERE TREATED BY DEFENDANT
IN HIS APPEAL BRIEF.
POINT VI.
THE FIGURE OF THE SALE AMOUNT AND
OF THE DAMAGES SHOULD BE CREDITED TO DEFENDANT AS OF THE DATE
THAT THE SALE SHOULD HAVE OCCURRED.
Plaintiff's Brief seems to miss the following points.
1. That the Court found the vehicles to be in control of Plaintiff in January, 1970, and that June 30, 1970,
was a reasonable time when the sale should have been
made.
2. The sale in January of 1972 was not therefore
commercially reasonable, and the Defendant was therefore entitled to a counterclaim offset of $40,700.00 as an
amount lost at that time by virtue of the fact that the
sale did not take place timely.
3. It is also apparent that if the sale had occurred
in June, 1970, the total sale price would have been obtained on that date, and there would have been no further
interest to be charged above the total sales price of
$85,450, all of which should have been deducted from
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sums due as of June 30, 1970. To allow the Plaintiff to
deduct $44,700 at the sale date in January, 1972, instead
of the date when the sale should have been made allows
the Plaintiff to benefit from his own wrongdoing. In the
Memorandum Opinion, the Court stated: "Interest
should be recomputed on the basis that the sale should
have been completed by June 30, 1970." R-45.
The first full paragraph contained on page 23 of
Plaintiffs Brief states that the Trial Court used the foregoing figures in arriving at its conclusion. The Trial Court
submitted no such figures nor accounting, but the accounting was submitted by Plaintiff. We submit that the accounting is in error.
DEFENDANT-APPELLANT CALCULATION
$109,673.97
Plus 2 A months' interest to June 30,
1970 at 10.5%
2,399.11
l

TOTAL INTEREST AND PRINCIPAL TO 6/30/70
112,073.08
Less Proceeds of sale
44,700.00
67,373.08

Less $40,750 (additional a m o u n t
which vehicles would have sold for
on June 30, 1970
40,750.00

Plus out-of-pocket expenses

26,623.08
2,477.31
29,100.39
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Plus interest on $26,623.08 to June 10,
1972, at 10.5%

5,590.84

Plus interest on $29,100.39 from June
10, 1972, through May 31, 1973

3,055.53

TOTAL JUDGMENT

$ 37,746.76

PLAINTIFF-RESPONDENT CALCULATION
Explanation
April 15, 1970, Payoff
Interest to June 30, 1970

Amount
$109,673.97
2,399.12

Total Due on June 30, 1970
$112,073.09
Less Loss for Non-Sale as of June 30,
1970
40,750.00
Total Due after Adjustment on June
30, 1970
71,323.09
Interest from July 1, 1970 to June 30,
1970
7,488.92
Total Due as of June 30, 1971
78,812.01
Interest from July 1, 1971, through
January, 1972
4,827.24
Total Due through January, 1972
Costs of Sale
Less Sales Price

83,639.25
2,477.31
44,700.00

Balance after Sale
41,416.56
Interest from February 1,1972 to January 31, 1973
4,348.74
Total Due as of January 31, 1973

$ 45,765.30
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POINT VII.
PLAINTIFF'S CLAIM THAT IT WAS NOT
OBLIGATED TO REPOSSESS THE SEVEN
TRUCKS IN QUESTION IS IN ERROR.
Mack Financial did repossess the trucks in question
and did exercise control and care over the trucks even to
the point of telling Mack Trucks when or whether they
could be sold and when they could be prepared for sale.
The effect of Plaintiff completing an Affidavit for which
they claim the repossession actually took place in January, 1972, was entirely self-serving and altered not at all
the condition of the vehicles or their possession or their
location or the power and authority exercised over those
vehicles.
Plaintiff cites a number of cases to make the point
that there is no repossession when a vehicle is taken into
custody by a once seller of a vehicle. All of these cases
may be distinguished in that the vehicles were either
abandoned on the street without control or care where
they could be damaged or destroyed, or the vehicles were
burned beyond recognition or the vehicles were being sold
under a Court Order or Writ of Replevin in which case
the Court addresses itself to a thirty day statute requiring
sale within thirty days of the repossession.
Trial Court in Memorandum Decisions stated:
"A comment is made in U. C. C. Reporting Service, Paragraph 9 504 at page 104, that with re-
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spect to Section 5072 that a secured party who
without proceeding under Section 5052 held collateral a long time without disposing of it thus
running up a large storage charge against the
debtor where no reason existed for not making
a prompt sale might well be found not to have
acted in a commercially reasonable manner. In
doing so, it also makes specific reference to the
section in good faith as cited above, supra."
The Utah Court stated:
"Conditional seller who repossessed property had
duty to exercise reasonable diligence and effort
to make resale of repossessed property within
reasonable time to produce best possible purchase price therefor, and creditor buyer with
proceeds as specified in contract/'
Knudsen Music Company v. Masterson, 240 Pac. 2d
973. The case also is cited in the conclusion reached in a
Washington case, Maestro Music, Inc. v. Rudolph Wertlizer Company, 354 Pac. 2d 266:
"A conditional seller or his assignee must deal
fairly so as to secure the best price reasonably
possible and must make it bring its fair market
value and account for the difference between the
amount owed it and the fair market value of the
product."
Uniform Commercial Code in 70A-9-507(2):
". . . If the secured party either sells the collateral in the usual manner in any recognized
market therefor or if he sells at the price curDigitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
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rent in such market at the time of such sale, or
if he has otherwise sold in conformity with reasonable commercial practices among dealers in
the type of property sold, he has sold in a commercially reasonable manner."
The fact is that the vehicles were not sold in such
manner; notice was not given and the vehicles were held
for a period of two years before sale took place. It is submitted that under the best possible interpretation in
favor of Plaintiff that the sale was not held in a commercially reasonable manner.
POINT VIII.
THE TRIAL COURT CORRECTLY RULED
WITH RESPECT TO ATTORNEY'S FEES
ON THE CASE AND CONSISTENT WITH
THE FINDING THAT THE SALE WAS NOT
COMMERCIALLY REASONABLE.
Counsel in his Brief cites Exhibits 3P and 4P which
provide that if the agreement shall be placed in the hands
of an attorney for collection, the Buyer shall pay a reasonable attorney's fees as specified in the document if permitted by law. This was not a simple action of collection,
but it was an action to resolve a number of very tangled
issues involved in the disposition of a substantial amount
of security. Just as important in the litigation were the
Defendant's counterclaims against Plaintiff as were the
Plaintiff's claims against the Defendant.
In 20 A. M. Jur. 2d Costs, Section 73, page 59, it is
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stated:
"Where authority is thus given (statute or contract) for awarding of attorney's fees, the matter of their allowance rests in the discretion of
the trial court, and the exercise of this discretion
will not be disturbed by an appellate court ex.
oept in the case of manifest abuse."
A Utah Court stated August 10, 1945:
"A debtor cannot be charged with failure to pay
an obligation and be held in default where the
default complained of is the result of the creditor's failure to accept payment in accordance
with the contract. . . "
Homeowners Loan v. Washington, 161 Pac. 2d 355,
108 Utah 469:
The case before this court is analogous.
Here the Defendant placed in the hands of the Plaintiff all of the vehicles, which, had they been sold on the
market at that time or had they been retailed out, pursuant to the testimony of various persons who sought to
make purchases of the trucks, this lawsuit might never
have occurred. It might well be that the entire indebtedness could have been paid from the sale of the vehicles.
Or, if the deficiency was of a reasonable nature, it would
not have been necessary to initiate legal action to collect
that deficiency. By virtue of the failure of the Plaintiff
to assume its responsibility and minimize damages and
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loss and to proceed to promptly sell at the best possible
price the security which had been left with it, the Plaintiff brought its legal action for a ridiculous amount of
$127,603.05, a figure which was completely unrelated to
any sums due to the Plaintiff under the best possible interpretation of the case.
It is submitted that the trial court was correct in its
denial of the petition to award attorney's fees.
Respectfully submitted,
LORIN N. PACE
431 South Third East, B-l
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
ROBERT DIGBY
217 Luhrs Tower
Phoenix, Arizona 85003
Attorneys for
Defendant-Appellant
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